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Act. The Court's reaffirmation of the consumer-protective four in-
stallment rule can be welcomed as having several possible salutary
effects. The preservation of the rule will serve as a boon to the
aware consumer anxious to put credit information to use in making
purchase decisions, will leave open the invitation to the presently
apathetic consumer to change his ways, and, at the very least, will
clarify the scope of the Federal Reserve Board's authority for all
future courts faced with Truth in Lending issues. However, by
rendering so important a decision on the basis of a fact situation
which is at best largely unrevealed and at worst beyond the scope of
Truth in Lending altogether, the Court may have left future
decision-making bodies the frustrating heritage of a rule now firmer
because of judicial recognition of its necessity, but no clearer in
range of application than before the matter reached the Supreme
Court.
WILLIAM B. ROBERTS
Labor Law—Reasonableness of Union Disciplinary Fines—NLRB
v. Boeing Co. 1 —Upon expiration of the collective bargaining
agreement between Booster Lodge No. 405 of the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM or
Machinists) and the Boeing Company, the union called a lawful
economic strike. During the strike, 143 of the 1900 production and
maintenance employees crossed the union picket lines to work. Of
these 143 employees, all were union members when the strike com-
menced, but 61 submitted written resignations before they crossed
the picket lines and an additional 58 resigned after they had first
crossed the lines. 2 After the strike ended, the union charged the 143
employees with violating the IAM constitution which provided
penalties (including fines) for "improper conduct" such as "[a]ccept-
ing employment . . . in an establishment where a strike . . . exists." 3
In accordance with union disciplinary procedures, including notice
and opportunity for a hearing, the union fined each of the 143
workers $450 and barred them from holding union office for five
years. 4
1 412 U.S. 67 (1973), rev'g Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143
(D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'g Booster Lodge 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004
(1970).
2 412 U.S. at 69 n.2.
' Id. at 69.
4 Id. There had been no warning before or during the strike that members would be
subject to disciplinary action for their strikebreaking activity. Id. at 80 (dissenting opinion). In
addition, the local union had not fined any of its members in its two-year history. Brief for
Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists as Intervenor at 31, Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists
v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
The fines of thirty-five employees who appeared at the union trial, apologized for their
conduct, and pledged loyalty to the union were reduced to 50% of their strikebreaking
earnings. 412 U.S. at 70 n.4.
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In an attempt to compel payment of the fines, 5 the union
threatened to, and in the case of nine employees did, commence
legal proceedings in state court to collect the fines plus attorney's
fees6
 and interest. Boeing then filed an unfair labor practice charge
with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the Board),
alleging that the fines imposed upon employees who had not re-
signed from the union were unreasonable in amount and therefore
violated section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA), 7 whiCh prohibits a union from restraining an employee in
the exercise of his right, guaranteed by section 7 of the NLRA, 8 to
refrain from concerted activities. 9
Upon a hearing, the trial examiner found that the union had
committed an unfair labor practice because the fines were impermis-
sibly excessive," but his determination on that issue was set aside
by the Board, which held in Booster Lodge 405, Machinists" that
the legality of union fines under the NLRA does not depend on their
reasonableness. In so holding, the Board relied upon its decision in
Machinists Local 504 (Arrow Development), 12 issued the same day,
5
 Eighteen of the members who received reduced fines paid in full, but none of the $450
fines were paid. 412 U.S. at 70 n.4.
6 In at least one case, the union filed suit in state court for $450 plus $180 in attorney
fees. Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 386 (1970) (trial examiner's
decision).
7 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970) provides in part:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--
(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That this paragraph shall not
impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with
respect to the acquisition or retention of membership therein; . . .
8
 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970) provides:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor
organizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing,
and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or
other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or
all of such activities except to the extent that such right may be affected by an
agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a condition of em-
ployment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title.
9 412 U.S. at 70. The Boeing company also charged that the union had committed an
unfair labor practice by fining members who resigned from the union. Id. That issue was
resolved by the Supreme Court in a companion case to Boeing, Booster Lodge 405, Machinists
v. NLRB, 412 U.S. 84 (1973), where it held that the union violated § 8(b)(1)(A) of the NLRA
when it sought court enforcement of fines imposed upon employees who had engaged in
strikebreaking activities after resigning from the union. Id. at 85. The validity of the fines
imposed upon members who resigned from the union is beyond the scope of this note. For a
discussion of the Court's decision in Booster Lodge 405, see Comment, Union Power to
Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1536, 1543-45 (1973). At the appellate
level and the NLRB level, the two cases had been joined under the name of Booster Lodge
405, Machinists. Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Booster Lodge 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004 (1970).
io 185 N.L.R.B. at 398 (trial examiner's decision). The trial examiner's decision is
reported following the Board's opinion, in id. at 384.
31
 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 383 n.16, 75 L.R.R.M. 1004, 1007 n.16 (1970).
12
 185 N.L.R.B. 365, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970), rev'd sub nom. O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472
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where it was held that the Board was not empowered by Congress
to examine the severity of otherwise lawful union discipline.' 3 The
Board in Arrow Development reasoned that Congress did not intend
that the Board regulate union fines imposed pursuant to a legitimate
union rule, and consequently that Congress intended that the Board
neither evaluate the severity of fines nor establish standards as to
their reasonableness." Further, the NLRB reasoned that local
courts are the logical tribunal for assessing the reasonableness of
fines because the legal enforceability of fines is "grounded in contract
theory," and because the question of reasonableness is "of an equi-
table nature rather than of the character of restraint and coercion
with which the National Labor Relations Act treats." 5
The Board's decision in Booster Lodge was appealed to the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, which rejected the
Board's assertion that the amount of a fine is immaterial to its
legality under the NLRA and directed the Board to determine the
reasonableness of the fines. 16
 The appellate court relied upon two
prior cases, NLRB v. Allis
-Chalmers Manufacturing Co." and
Scofield v. NLRB,' 8
 in which the Supreme Court had upheld
court-enforceable union disciplinary fines imposed pursuant to a
valid union rule. In Booster Lodge, the court of appeals inferred
from the Supreme Court's repeated use of the qualification "reason-
able" in both Allis -Chalmers and Scofield that only such fines were
protected." In addition, since in Allis-Chalmers a reasonable fine for
strikebreaking was found to be legitimate because it imposed a less
F.2d 426 (9th Cir. 1972). The .
 court of appeals remanded that case to 'the Board for a
determination as to the reasonableness of the union fines. See also Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB,
472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972).
13
 185 N.L.R.B. at 368, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1011. Accord, American Newspaper Guild
(Washington Post Co.), 186 N.L.R.B. 877, 75 L.R.R.M, 1438 (1970); Communication Work-
ers Local 2100 (Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co.), 186 N.L.R.B. 873, 75 L.R.R.M. 1441
(1970); Communication Workers Local 6222 (Southwestern Bell Tel. Co.), 186 N.L.R.B. 312,
75 L.R.R.M. 1324 (1970); Local 488, UAW (General Motors Corp.), 185 N.L.R.B. 890, 75
L.R.R.M. 1242 (1970).
14
 185 N.L.R.B. at 368, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1010.
13
 Id. Former Chairman McCulloch dissented in Arrow Development on the ground that
the imposition of a disproportionately large fine would warrant the inference that the union's
purpose was not legitimate, and would constitute a total restraint on an employee's right to
refrain from concerted activities under § 7. Id. at 370-71, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1012-13. Moreover,
Member McCulloch stressed the need for uniformity as opposed to a doctrine of "reverse
preemption" whereby states would develop diverse standards as to reasonableness. Id. at 371,
75 L.R.R.M. at 1013.
16 459 K2c1 . 1143, 1155-56, 1159 (D.C. Cir. 1972). Accord, O'Reilly v. NLRB, 472 F.2d
426 (9th Cir. 1972); Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416 (9th Cir. 1972). But see U.O.P.
Norplex v, NLRB, 445 F.2d 155, 158 (7th Cir. 1971) (dictum). See generally Note, 1973 Duke
L.J. 328; Note, 6 Ga. L. Rev. 631 (1972); 1971-1972 Annual Survey of Labor Relations Laws,
13 B.C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 1347, 1435 (1972).
388 U.S. 175 (1967).
' 3 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
19
 459 F.2d at 1156-57. The qualification "reasonable" was repeatedly used by the court
in Allis -Chalmers, 388 U.S. at 181, 183, 192-93, and in Scofield, 394 U.S. at 428, 430, 436.
For a discussion of these two cases, see text at notes 29-36 infra.
408
CASE NOTES
onerous penalty than that imposed by expulsion from union
membership, 2 ° the court of appeals in Booster Lodge reasoned that
an excessive fine would not be protected under section 8(b)(1)(A) and
would constitute an unfair labor practice since it could place a
greater burden on the employee than mere expulsion. 2 ' Despite the
court's recognition of the traditional role of state courts in adjudicat-
ing matters of internal union discipline and of the potential for
conflict between the Board and state courts which, in any event,
will have to examine the reasonableness of fines in suits brought to
enforce them, the court maintained that the Board was a proper
tribunal to exercise review. 22 The court buttressed its legal argu-
ments with a discussion of the policy factors that favor Board
review—the need for uniform national labor standards, the prohibi-
tive cost of litigation at the state level, and the Board's experience in
the related areas of assessing the reasonableness of union initiation
fees. 23
On certiorari, the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Boeing Co.
reversed the court of appeals and, with three justices dissenting,
HELD: the Board is justified in refusing to evaluate the reasonable-
ness of fines imposed by a union upon members who crossed the
picket lines during a lawful strike, because the severity of an other-
wise valid fine is an internal union affair not affecting the em-
ployee-employer relationship and not otherwise violative of the
policies of the NLRA. 24 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court,
further ruled that assessing the reasonableness of disciplinary fines is
a matter for the state courts to determine under the law of contracts
and voluntary association in proceedings brought to enforce the
fine. 25
This note will first briefly examine Boeing in relation to the
three major decisions in which the Supreme Court has considered
the relationship of section 8(b)(1)(A) and its proviso to the enforce-
ment of union disciplinary rules: NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufac-
turing Co. 26 Scofield v. NLRB 27 and NLRB v. Marine & Ship -
building Iborkers. 28 The Court's decision in Boeing will then be
discussed in terms of the policy factors which pertain to whether
reasonableness should be reviewed by state courts or by the Board.
Finally, the need for a uniform standard of reasonableness will be
29 388 U.S. at 191-92.
21 459 F.2d at 1156.
'= Id, at 1157.
23 Id. at 1158. Section 8(b)(5) of the NLRA directs the NLRB to assess the reasonable-
ness of initiation fees in terms of "the practices and customs of labor organizations in the
particular industry, and the wages currently paid to the employees affected . . . ." 29 U.S.C. §
158(b)(5) (1970).
24 412 U.S. at 78.
25 Id. at 74.
'° 388 U.S. 175 (1967).
27 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
28 391 U.S. 418 (1968).
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demonstrated and the various standards of reasonableness available
to the courts will be examined.
An analysis of Boeing in the context of prior Supreme Court
decisions dealing with the validity of union disciplinary rules must
begin with the 1967 Allis-Chalmers decision. There the Court held
that court enforcement of a reasonable fine imposed by a union for
crossing a picket line during a lawful strike did not restrain or coerce
the fined member in violation of section 8(b)(1)(A). 29 The Court
found it unnecessary to rely on the proviso to that section, which
guarantees a union the right to prescribe rules governing union
membership, but instead cited it as "cogent support" for the proposi-
tion that Congress, in enacting section 8(b)(1)(A), did not intend to
interfere with the internal affairs of unions." The Court emphasized
the strong federal labor policy favoring union maintenance of strike
discipline because such discipline is essential to the union's ability to
bargain collectively.''
Although Allis-Chalmers was delivered by a closely divided
Court, its doctrine was explicitly reaffirmed by a 7-1 majority in
Scofield. There the Court sustained union fines imposed for viola-
tions of a union bylaw prescribing production ceilings for piece-rate
workers. The Court noted that the union rule reflected a legitimate
union interest—preventing industrial speed-ups—and more _impor-
tantly, it did not contravene national labor policy or law. 32 In
contrast, the Court in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers found that
the union's expulsion of a member for failure to exhaust internal
union remedies before filing an unfair labor practice charge with the
Board was a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation because of the overriding
statutory policy of securing unimpeded access to the Board."
In this trilogy, the Court refused to follow a simplistic approach
of invalidating all fines because they are "coercive" under section
8(b)(1)(A) and of upholding all expulsions from union membership
on the basis that the proviso has been interpreted to sanction such
action. 34
 Instead, the Court determined that union disciplinary ac-
19 388 U.S. at 195 (four justices dissenting). For more extensive discussions of Allis-
Chalmers and its implications, see Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the
National Labor Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 Duke L.J. 1067;
Harrison, Union Discipline and the Employer-Employee Relationship, 22 Lab. L.J. 216
0971); Silard, Labor Board Regulation of Union Discipline After Allis-Chalmers, Marine
Workers and Scofield, 38 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 187 0969); Note, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 1094
(1968).
" 388 U.S. at 191.
3 ' Id. at 180-81. •
32 394 U.S. at 436.
33 391 U.S. at 424, 428.
34 The Court in Allis-Chalmers explicitly rejected a literal reading of §§ 7 and 8(b){1)(A)
in favor of recourse to the legislative history, stating: "When the literal application of the
imprecise words 'restrain or coerce' Congress employed in § 8(b)(1)(A) produces the extraordi-
nary results we have mentioned we should determine whether this meaning is confirmed in the
legislative history of the section." 388 U.S. at 184.
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Lion was a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation only if it offended an overrid-
ing public policy imbedded in the federal labor laws. 35
 These cases
strongly indicate that the validity under the NLRA of internal union
rules, intended by Congress to be outside Board regulation, is to be
defined not on the basis of the form or severity of the union discipli-
nary action, but on the basis of whether the rules are consistent with
national labor policies. 36
Although Allis
-Chalmers established the validity of a union
rule, enforceable by fine in a civil suit, requiring its members to
refrain from strikebreaking, it did not reach the specific question
presented in Boeing—given the validity of the rule, should the
Board decide whether the size of the fine is excessive and whether as
such it is a section 8(b)(1)(A) violation?” Both the majority and the
dissent in Boeing read Allis -Chalmers as supporting their positions.
The three dissenters in Boeing, as well as the court of appeals,
considered it implicit in Allis-Chalmers and Scofield that the en-
forceability of a fine depends on its reasonableness." While this
interpretation is not inconsistent with the language of the cases, 39 it
ignores the underlying rationale of the decisions. It is submitted that
the result in Boeing is consistent with the reasoning of those earlier
cases for three major reasons.
First, although the fines in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield
were conceded to be reasonable, 4° they were not upheld because of
their reasonableness or non-coerciveness, but, as noted by the Boe-
ing majority, because Congress did not intend that section 8(b)(1)(A)
apply to internal union affairs not affecting a member's employment
status.'" The Court in Allis-Chalmers made extensive use of the
legislative history to demonstrate that section 8(b)(1)(A) was not
meant to apply to "traditional internal union discipline in general, or
disciplinary fines in .particular,"42
 but rather that the section was
35 See Gould, supra note 29, at 1070-77; Silard, supra note 29, at 192-93.
36
 This analysis is consistent with the Board's interpretation of these Supreme Court
cases as indicated in Arrow Development, 185 N.L.R.B. 365, 75 L.R.R.M. 1008 (1970).
There, the Board distinguished the fine for strikebreaking in Arrow Development from the fine
invalidated by the Supreme Court in Marine & Shipbuilding Workers by saying "it was the
reason for the discipline (fining of members who had filed charges with the Board) rather than
its severity which made the discipline unlawful." Id. at 366 n.5, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1009 n.5. See
also Schlossberg & Lubin, Union Fines and Union Discipline Under the National Labor
Relations Act, 23 N.Y.U. Conf. on Labor 207, 214 (1971); Silard, supra note 29, at 191.
37 The Court in Allis-Chalmers did not address this issue since the fines were not
challenged as being excessive. 388 U.S. at 192-93 n,30. In addition, the Court stated:
"Whether § 8(b)(1)(A) proscribes arbitrary imposition of fines, or punishment for disobedience
of a fiat of a union leader, are matters not presented by this case, and upon which we express
no view." Id. at 195.
38
 412 U.S. at 81 (dissenting opinion).
39 See note 19 supra,
40
 388 U.S. at 192-93 n.30; 394 U.S. at 430.
41 412 U.S. at 73.
42
 388 U.S. at 186.
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primarily concerned with union coercion during organizational
drives and with union violence. 43 The Boeing Court correctly recog-
nized that the premise of Allis-Chalmers that section 8(b)(1)(A) "was
not meant to regulate the internal affairs of unions" 44 would be
negated by Board review of fines, since it would require a searching
inquiry by the Board into a union's internal affairs. 45 Board review
would necessarily entail an examination of the union's motivation
for imposing the fine,46 its constitution, internal remedies and pro-
cedures, and the implementation of its rules. It appears that this
result would be patently offensive to the intent of Congress as
previously construed by the Court and the Board. The Board has
consistently maintained:
[T]he Board has not been empowered by Congress to police
a union decision that a member is or is not in good stand-
ing or to pass judgment on the penalties a union may
impose on a member so long as the penalty does not impair
the member's status as an employee.'"
Secondly, the Court in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield relied
upon and endorsed the strong tradition of state court enforcement of
union fines to sustain its interpretation of the NLRA. In Allis-
Chalmers, the Court recognized that union discipline has historically
been a question within the jurisdiction of state courts due to the
contractual conception of the relationship between a member and
his union. 48 Justice Brennan, speaking for the Court, indicated
approval of state court jurisdiction by saying "state courts, in re-
viewing the imposition of union discipline, find ways to strike down
`discipline [which] involves a severe hardship.' "49 In Scofield, Jus-
tice White stated: "Unless the rule or its enforcement impinges on
some policy of the federal labor law, the regulation of the relation-
ship between union and employee is a contractual matter governed
by local law."5 °
It follows from this emphasis on the state court's historical
involvement in "establishing standards of fairness in the enforce-
ment of union discipline"51 that the Court in these earlier decisions
did not envision a disruption of the traditional allocation of func-
tions between the Board and the state courts. To sanction Board
review in Boeing would have had the practical effect of either
Id. at 184-92.
44 Id. at 186.
45 412 U.S. at 74.
46
 Id.
47 Local 283, UAW (Scofield), 145 N.L.R.B. 1097, 1104 (1964), aff'd sub nom. Scofield
v. NLRB, 394 U.S. 423 (1969).
48 388 U.S. at 182-83 & n.9.
49 Id. at 193 n.32, quoting Summers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 Harv.
L. Rev. 1049, 1078 (1951).
5° 394 U.S. at 426 n.3. See also Gould, supra note 29, at 1133.
51 388 U.S. at 182.
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terminating the established jurisdiction of state courts to provide
relief in union disciplinary suits or diluting its effectiveness by
creating the potential for conflict between the Board and the
courts, 52
 each of which would be exercising concurrent jurisdiction
in reviewing the same fine. 53
Finally, the Boeing Court reasoned logically from the prior
cases when it rejected the argument that since reasonable fines are
not an unfair labor practice, unreasonable fines are. 54
 The Court in
Allis-Chalmers recognized that court-enforceable fines do not "re-
strain or coerce" within the meaning of section 8(b)(1)(A), for to
deter a union member from working during a lawful strike—labor's
"ultimate weapon"—is consistent with federal labor policy." It
would be anomalous to say that a reasonable fine, presumably the
minimum necessary to compel compliance, 56
 does not affect a
member's employment status, whereas an excessive fine does. Unless
the union induces an employer to threaten the member with suspen-
sion or discharge as a means of collecting the fine, a member's
employment status is unaffected, regardless of the size of the fine. 57
Thus, it is submitted that the holding in Boeing is mandated by
the underlying rationale of the previous Supreme Court decisions
regarding the validity of union disciplinary rules. If the Court in
Boeing were to infer that only reasonable fines were protected under
section 8(b)(1)(A), all arguably excessive fines would be subject to
Board review, and as a result, the major thrust of prior
decisions—that Congress did not intend for the Board to regulate
the internal rules of labor unions unless they contravene national
labor policy—would be undercut. In addition, to conclude that the
Board should assess the reasonableness of fines would disrupt the
traditional role of state courts in enforcing union disciplinary fines, a
practice approved by the Court in both Allis-Chalmers and Scofield.
For the Court in Boeing to extend "the implications of the dicta"58
in these earlier cases would constitute a significant departure from
their rationale.
Although the decision in Boeing is consistent with the legisla-
tive intent in regard to section 8(b)(1)(A), as construed by the Court
in Allis-Chalmers, as well as with the rationale of prior Court
decisions, it is also appropriate to evaluate the policy arguments
favoring Board review of the severity of union fines. The Supreme
Court dissenters in Boeing and the court of appeals presented sev-
eral seemingly persuasive policy considerations in support of Board
52
 See Silard, supra note 29, at 197.
53
 See text at notes 84-89 infra.
54 412 U.S. at 72-73.
55 388 U.S. at 178-82.
56
 See text at notes 106-11 infra.
87
 See Justice Browning's dissent in Morton Salt Co. v. NLRB, 472 F.2d 416, 425 (9th
Cir. 1472).
$ 8 412 U.S. at 72.
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jurisdiction to determine reasonableness: the Board procedures
would be less costly, since the agency absorbs the cost of prosecuting
an employee's claim;" the Board could apply its specialized
expertise; 6° and the Board would provide uniform standards for
assessing reason ableness 6 '
Although at face value these arguments seem appealing, a
further examination is necessary to assess their merits. As to the first
policy argument—that Board jurisdiction would lessen the financial
burden on the employee, since the agency bears the expense of
litigation—it is curious to note that Justice Douglas, who made this
argument in the Boeing dissent, dissented in Amalgamated Associa-
tion of Street Employees v. Lockridge 62 on the ground that forcing
an employee from Idaho to go to the Board in Washington, D.C. for
relief imposes a great financial hardship on him. 63 In Lockridge,
Justice Douglas disparaged Board jurisdiction by stating that "there
is not a trace of equity in this long-drawn, expensive remedy."64 In
addition, if a union chooses to seek judicial enforcement of a fine
imposed upon strikebreakers, a course of action which was sus-
tained in Allis -Chalmers, the member will still be forced to defend a
suit for collection of the fine in state court regardless of the availabil-
ity of the Board as a forum. This duplication of procedures will be
expensive for the employee, as well as time-consuming, especially in
light of the Board's ever-increasing workload. 65 Furthermore, the
expense involved in litigating in state court could be mitigated by an
employer's providing counsel for the employees. 66
Concerning the second policy argument advanced—that the
Board has the necessary expertise to police unions and to assess the
reasonableness of fines—it is questionable whether the reasonable-
ness of fines presents an issue for which specialized agency review is
needed. State courts have been adjudicating disputes over union
administration of internal discipline for more than half a century. 67
The Supreme Court has recognized: "The fairness of an internal
union disciplinary proceeding is hardly a question beyond 'the con-
39
 Id. at 82 (dissenting opinion).
611 Id. at 83 (dissenting opinion).
61 Id. at 79 (dissenting opinion).
61 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
63 Id. at 303 (dissenting opinion).
64 Id. at 304 (dissenting opinion).
63
 See Silard, supra note 29, at 194; Note, 1973 Duke L.J. 328, 332 n.27.
66 In Boeing, the company undertook to defend the suits against individual employees by
the union, but made no general communication of the policy to the workers. Booster Lodge
No. 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.13. at 386 (trial examiner's decision). In addition, the Board
has held in one instance that an employer may promise to pay the union fine. Standard
Plumbing & Heating Co., 185 N.L.R.B. 444, 444-45, 75 L.R.R.M. 1065, 1066-67 (1970). See
generally Gould, supra note 29, at 1126.
67 Summers, The Law of Union Discipline: What the Courts Do in Fact, 70 Yale L.J.
175 (1960).
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ventional experience of judges,' nor can it be said to raise issues
`within the special competence' of the NLRB.""
The final policy argument—that only the Board could establish
uniform standards—is by far the most compelling reason advanced
in favor of Board review of the reasonableness of union fines. Chief
Justice Burger, dissenting in Boeing, argues that the application of
diverse state common law would be contrary to national labor
policy, the fundamental purpose of which is to promote uniformity
within the field of labor relations." In support of this position,
commentators have pointed out that due to the inappropriateness of
applying contract law to the union-member relationship, state courts
cannot be relied upon to establish uniform standards by which union
disciplinary disputes may be resolved." In rebuttal, the following
section of this note will show that state courts will be forced to
develop standards because they will be unable to rely on contract
theory, and that the need for national uniformity, which can only be
achieved by preempting the jurisdiction of state courts to assess the
reasonableness of fines, is outweighed by the negative implications
of invoking the preemption doctrine.
Chief Justice Burger's contention that Board review will pro-
mote national uniformity 71 reflects a frequently expressed policy
consideration. The application of diverse state common law, it is
argued, could have a detrimental impact on congressional intent, as
expressed in the National Labor Relations Act, that labor disputes
are to be regulated under a uniform federal law. 72 Congressional
labor legislation is designed to maintain a delicate balance of power
between labor and management so as to prevent industrial strife and
to guarantee the rights of the workers. This purpose could be
frustrated if some state courts refused to enforce legitimate fines for
crossing a picket line while those of other states sustained excessive
fines. The imposition of unreasonable fines would provide unions
with an excessively powerful disciplinary tool, while refusal to up-
hold anything but insignificant fines could undercut the effectiveness
of otherwise valid union rules. In either case, the bargaining posi-
tion of the union could be greatly affected," and the existing bal-
ance of power between labor and management could be disturbed.
This argument that Board review of the reasonableness of fines
is necessary to promote uniformity is buttressed by the frequent
criticism of the ability of state courts adequately to enforce union
" International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. Hardeman, 401 U.S. 233, 238-39 (1971).
411 U.S. at 79 (dissenting opinion).
'° See authorities cited in note 74 infra.
7 ' 412 U.S, at 79 (dissenting opinion).
72 29 U.S.C. 141(b) (1970). See generally The Developing Labor Law 782.85 (C. Morris
ed. 1971); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 (1972).
73 See Note, 53 Cornell L. Rev. 1094, 1102-03 (1968); Comment, Union Power to
Discipline Members Who Resign, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1536, 1558-59 (1973).
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discipline. 74
 This criticism is based on the premise that the contract
analysis of union membership used by courts to reach their results is
a legal fabrication which provides no clear, workable standards for
defining the limits on union discipline. 75
 It is this failure of the state
courts to establish standards that makes the multiplicity of forums
especially troublesome.
The inability of state courts to define standards stems from the
doctrinal inadequacy of contract theory. The power of the union to
discipline its members is derived from a supposed contractual rela-
tionship between the union and its members. The union constitution
and bylaws are deemed to be the contract. However, to view the
union-member relationship as contractual is to imply that upon
joining the union a worker consents to fines, suspension or
expulsion76
 while the union, usually by majority vote, retains the
right to amend any term at any time. 77
 In practice, the terms of the
contract are dictated by the union; a prospective member can only
accept or reject those offered. 78
 In addition, the union constitution
and bylaws are often too genera] or vague to achieve the certainty
ordinarily required by contract law. For these reasons, contract
theory provides an inadequate framework for state courts to adjudi-
cate internal union disciplinary disputes.
As a result of the inappropriateness of applying traditional
contract theory to the relationship of the union to its members,
courts have freely superimposed their own standards in an effort to
avoid unjust results; courts often arrive at their decisions not from
established standards of fairness but through result-oriented
jurisprudence. 79
 In addition, courts commonly obscure their reason-
ing with contract language or protestations of judicial neutrality,
and as a result, "courts have produced a body of law which seems
inconsistent in result and contradictory in principle." 8°
However, in response to the argument that state courts operat-
ing in the context of contract theory are unlikely to define workable
standards, it should be noted that the legal fiction of contract theory
74
 See, e.g., Johannesen, Disciplinary Fines as Interference with Protected Rights: Sec-
tion 8(b)(1)(A), 24 Lab. L.J. 268 (1973); Summers, supra note 67; Summers, supra note 49;
Note, supra note 73; Note, 25 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 273 (1968).
7 ' Summers, supra note 67, at 180.
76
 It should be noted that a union's disciplinary powers are circumscribed to a limited
extent by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin
Act), 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970). This Act guarantees certain political and procedural rights
to a union member. For instance, § 101(a)(5) of the Act requires notice and a hearing before a
union may fine, suspend or expel a member. 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5) (1970). The Act also
attempts to protect certain individual activities from union discipline. A member has the
rights of free speech and assembly, the right to attend and participate in deliberations at union
meetings, and the right to vote in union elections. 29 U.S.C. §§. 411(a)(1), (2) (1970).
Johannesen, supra note 74, at 274.
78
 See Summers, supra note 49, at 1055; Note, supra note 73, at 1100; Note, 25 Wash. &
Lee L. Rev. 273, 277 (1968).
" See Summers, supra note 67. See also Note, supra note 73, at 1099.
8° Summers, supra note 49, at 1100.
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used by state courts in suits to collect fines could not realistically be
relied upon in judging the reasonableness of fines. Despite the Boe-
ing directive to decide the issue on the basis of contract theory," a
fine is unknown in contract law except insofar as a fine can be
equated with a penalty imposed under the guise of liquidated
damages. 82
 It is submitted that contract analysis would not be
applicable, since it would be impractical to determine if a fine is
reasonable in terms of the actual damages suffered. A disciplinary
fine is not imposed to compensate a loss, but rather to serve as a
deterrent or a punishment. For this reason, courts will not be able to
obscure the issue of reasonableness, as they have done when decid-
ing whether to enforce the fine, and, in fact, those courts which
have considered the reasonableness of union fines have not utilized
commercial contract principles. 83 As a result, state courts will be
compelled to face the issue squarely and to attempt to define equita-
ble standards by which to judge fines.
Nonetheless, it is still arguable that the Board would be a better
forum for determining the reasonableness of a fine in order to
promote uniformity throughout the country. But as recognized by
the Boeing majority, there are practical problems in achieving this
result. Since state courts would continue to have jurisdiction to
consider reasonableness when enforcing the fines, independent
Board determination of reasonableness in an unfair labor practice
context might result in conflict as to the same fine. 84
 The only way
to avoid this untenable conflict between the NLRB and the state
courts, a problem ignored in both the Boeing dissent and the court
of appeals decision, would be for the Supreme Court to hold that
state courts are preempted from exercising jurisdiction as to the
reasonableness of fines pending Board determination. 85
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon," the Su-
preme Court held that where the conduct engaged in was arguably
protected by section 7 or prohibited by section 8 of the National
1 ' 412 U.S. at 74.
H See generally 5 S. Williston, Law of Contracts	 769-811 (3d ed. 1961).
" See, e.g., Auto Workers Local 283 v. Scofield, 76 L.R.R.M. 2433 (Wis. Sup. Ct.
1971); North Jersey Newspaper Guild Local 173 v. Rakos, 110 N.J. Super. 77, 264 A.2d 453,
74 L.R.R.M. 2487 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1970); Farnum v. Kurtz, 70 L.R.R.M. 2035 (Los Angeles
Mun. Ct. 1968).
84 412 U.S. at 77-78.
85 For a discussion of preemption in the field of labor law, see The Developing Labor
Law 785-94 (C. Morris ed. 1971); Broomfield, Preemptive Federal Jurisdiction Over Con-
certed Trespassory Union Activity, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 552 (1970); Come, Federal Preemption
of Labor-Management Relations: Current Problems in the Application of Garmon, 56 Va. L.
Rev. 1435 (1970); Cox, Labor Law Preemption Revisited, 86 Harv. L. Rev. 1337 (1972);
Gould, The Garmon Case: Decline and Threshold of "Litigating Elucidation," 39 U. Det, L.J.
539 (1962); Isaacson, Federal Preemption Under the Taft-Hartley Act, 11 Ind. & Lab. Rel.
Rev. 391 (1958); Lesnick, Preemption Reconsidered: The Apparent Reaffirmation of Garman,
72 Colum. L. Rev. 469 (1972); Michelman, State Power to Govern Concerted Employee
Activities, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 641 (1961).
16 359 U.S. 236, 245 (1959).
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Labor Relations Act, the doctrine of federal preemption precluded
the exercise of state court jurisdiction. If the Court were to conclude
that an excessive fine constituted an unfair labor practice, the fine
would arguably be prohibited by section 8 pending a determination
of its reasonableness by the Board. Due to this characterization of
the fine, the state courts would be unable to enforce the fine until the
Board had acted. But the Board could not act unless the employee
or his employer filed a charge with the Board alleging an unfair
labor practice. If state courts were ousted of their jurisdiction, there
would be no incentive for the recalcitrant member or his employer to
challenge the fine before the Board. The union would then be
without a remedy, 87 a situation which, in other contexts, has pro-
voked concern among members of the Supreme Court 88 and
commentators." Thus, the effort to achieve uniformity could have
the effect of preventing the union from collecting its fine and would
make meaningless the right sanctioned by Allis-Chalmers.
The union's "right without a remedy" dilemma would not be
limited to fines for strikebreaking; whenever a union fined a member
in order to enforce a valid union rule, the claim of excessiveness
would prevent adjudication by the state courts until an employee or
his employer filed a charge with the Board. In the unlikely event
that a charge was filed, the Board would have to assess reasonable-
ness prior to determining liability. Also, this would, contrary to the
intent of Allis-Chalmers, involve the Board in every internal union
dispute where a claim of unreasonableness was made. Thus, appli-
cation of the preemption doctrine in Boeing would nullify the under-
lying rationale of the Supreme Court's decision in Allis -Chalmers
and related cases involving union disciplinary disputes.
To summarize briefly, the majority in Boeing was correct to
reject the three policy arguments presented by the dissenters and the
court of appeals. Analysis reveals that the financial hardship to the
employee would not be alleviated by Board review of the reason-
ableness of fines because the employee would still be forced to
defend in state court a collection suit brought by the union. Sec-
ondly, the Board has no more expertise in this area than do the state
courts which have long exercised jurisdiction in determining . the
propriety of union discipline. Lastly, in order to achieve uniform
standards as to the reasonableness of fines, the Court would have to
87 See Gould, Some Limitations Upon Union Discipline Under the National Labor
Relations Act: The Radiations of Allis-Chalmers, 1970 Duke L. J. 1067, 1135; Note, supra note
65, at 333-34.
88 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
The dissenters in that case, Justices Douglas, White and Blackmun and Chief Justice Burger,
all agreed that the preemption doctrine should not be allowed to leave a party to a labor
dispute without an effective remedy. Id. at 303-05, 329-32 (dissenting opinions). The dissen-
ters also agreed that the doctrine of preemption should not apply to union-member controver-
sies. Id. at 305, 322-23 (dissenting opinions).
69 Come, supra note 85, at 1437; Cox, supra note 85, at 1363; Gould, supra note 85, at
66-69; Michelman, supra note 85, at 645-48.
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preempt the jurisdiction of state courts, and preemption would have
the result of increasing Board involvement in internal union affairs
contrary to the intent of Congress, and it could leave the union
without a remedy. These consequences far outweigh any interest in
uniformity.
Although the Boeing decision eliminates the possibility of the
Board establishing uniform standards to judge the reasonableness of
disciplinary fines, state courts might achieve uniformity and predic-
tability, at least within their jurisdictions, if "reasonableness" can be
satisfactorily defined. The first issue which the state courts must
resolve is whether to define reasonableness on an individual, case-
by-case basis or to develop standards that can be applied uniformly.
If a standard is desired, then the acceptability of various standards
must be evaluated, in terms of the likelihood that they will accom-
plish the legitimate purposes of a union fine.
The need for standards is clear. If the state courts were to
articulate standards governing the imposition of fines, there would
be guidelines for future court enforcement of strikebreaking fines. 90
This in turn would create uniformity at least within the jurisdiction
and would facilitate the administration of justice. Standards will
also provide a degree of predictability and notice to the unions and
employees whose rights and obligations are at stake. 91 The
definition of equitable standards should help to deter a union from
threatening its members with excessive fines, 92 and at the same time
prevent trial courts from upholding only the most minimal fines. 93
This latter possibility poses the more severe danger to the delicate
employer-employee balance, since the failure to enforce reasonable
fines could undercut the effectiveness of a union's ability to maintain
strike solidarity which is intimately related to its capacity to bargain
collectively." The need for uniformity and impartiality should out-
weigh the countervailing desire to assess guilt on an individual,
case-by-case basis. Although a uniform standard fails to allow for an
examination of an individual's motivations or particular situation,
the impracticality of this type of analysis is amply demonstrated by
the Boeing case.
At the hearing in Boeing, the General Counsel urged the trial
examiner to consider the financial effects of Hurricane Betsy on the
fined members. 95
 The trial examiner recognized that this could
involve an evaluation of such variables as the amount of water in
9°
 See Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.B. 380, 392 (1970) (trial
examiner's decision); Rapore, Protected Rights and Union Sanctions under Section 8(b)(1)(A)
of the NLRA, 21 Lab. L.J. 728, 736 (1970).
91
 185 N.L.R.B. at 392 (trial examiner's decision).
92
 This concern was expressed by Justice Black in his dissent in Allis-Chalmers, 388 U.S.
at 204.
93 See Comment, supra note 73, at 1559.
94 Id.
95 Booster Lodge No. 405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R.B. at 390 (1970) (trial examiner's
decision).
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the fined employee's basement, the number of dependent children
and relatives, and the extent of his outstanding financial
obligations. 96 The trial examiner rejected such folly and simply
proposed a formula based on a percentage of the earnings of the
strikebreakers." It seems apparent that to consider the par-
ticularities of each fined individual's situation would not only be
impractical, but also unjust, for many of the strikers may have also
been subject to economic hardship due to the hurricane or sick
relatives. It would be unrealistic for the trier of facts, in an effort to
be even-handed, to review each member's economic situation, espe-
cially in a union of 1900 members, in order to weigh the burdens
borne during the strike.
For similar reasons, it is submitted that the factors suggested by
the District of Columbia Circuit in Booster Lodge would be unac-
ceptable as standards. The factors proposed included: compensation
received by the strikebreakers, the level of the strike benefits pro-
vided to strikers, the individual needs of the strikebreakers, the
detrimental impact of strikebreaking upon the effectiveness of the
work stoppage, the strength of the union, the availability of alterna-
tive remedies and the effect on an individual's employment status. 98
The Supreme Court in Boeing indicated tacit approval of these
factors:
Inquiry by the Board into the multiplicity of factors that
the parties and the Court of Appeals correctly thought to
have a bearing on the issue of reasonableness would neces-
sarily lead the Board to a substantial involvement in
strictly internal union affairs. 99
But as the Board convincingly argued, the weighing and
balancing of these factors would not result in standards or unifor-
mity since the variables are so particularized and individualized.'"
In effect, the suggestions would result in complete discretion for the
trier of facts and would necessitate a case-by-case analysis from
which no guidelines could be extracted. It is unlikely that two
persons assessing the strength of a union, the impact of violating the
union rules, and the needs of individual strikebreakers would arrive
at the same dollar figure for a reasonable fine. The calculations are
too subjective to achieve the purposes, outlined above, to be served
by establishing standards.
Nevertheless, it may be possible to devise a workable standard.
It must first be recognized that in determining the reasonableness of
a fine imposed for strikebreaking, courts are faced with the problem
98 Id. at 391.
97 Id. at 394.
98 459 F.2d at 1159.
99 412 U.S. at 74 (emphasis added).
'°° Brief for Petitioner at 14 n.14, NLRB v. Boeing, 412 U.S. 67 (1973).
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of accommodating majority and minority interests.'° 1
 In effect, the
court must strike a balance between protecting the union's interest
in maintaining sufficient strike solidarity to enable it to bargain
collectively and the individual's interest in refraining from "con-
certed activities." 102 A member may wish to work during a strike for
financial reasons; he may fear that he will lose his job;' 03 or he may
disagree with the purpose of the strike. In any case, a court-enforced
fine, unlike expulsion, can virtually compel participation in the
strike unless the member is willing to resign from the union. 104 But
as Professors Bok and Dunlop point out:
[W]hat is wrong with giving this power to the union? Why
should individuals be free to avoid the strike and thus
endanger the objectives, and even the jobs, of the major-
ity? After all, the minority must adhere to the terms of
employment negotiated by the majority. Why should it not
also be compelled to comply with a strike that is called to
achieve these terms?'° 5
In weighing these competing interests, it is useful first to deter-
mine the purpose of a fine. It is argued by the union that a fine
should be viewed as a punishment and as such should not be limited
to the monetary benefit that a wrongdoer derives from his
offense.'" But this reasoning ignores the rationale of Allis-
Chalmers. Implicit in that Court's analysis is the concept that a
union has a legitimate interest in imposing a fine for strikebreaking
in order to protect its status as an effective collective bargaining
agent.'" The fine was conceived by the Court as a means of
preventing members from jeopardizing the "usefulness of labor's
cherished strike weapon."'" This reasoning implies that a fine
should be imposed to compel an employee to adhere to a union's
anti-strikebreaking rule; it should not be punitive but essentially
deterrent in nature. 1 °9
 If it serves as a deterrent, the fine would be
justifiable as protective of a legitimate union interest—assuring
compliance with valid union rules—and not merely as retribution.
1 ° 1 D. Bok & J. Dunlop, Labor and the American Community 105-06 (1970).
1 ° 2 Id.
uu See NLRB v, MacKay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938), which permits an
employer permanently to replace economic strikers.
1 " In NLRB v. Textile Workers Local 1029 (Granite State), 409 U.S. 213 (1972), and
Booster Lodge 405, Machinists v, NLRB, 412 U.S, 84 (1973), the Court held that a union
violated § 8(b)(1)(A) if it sought to enforce fines against strikebreaking members who resigned
from the union. A member may only be fined for activities occurring before his resignation.
105
	 Bok & J. Dunlop, supra note 101, at 105-06.
1 " Brief for Booster Lodge No. 405, IAM as Intervenor at 22, Booster Lodge No. 405,
Machinists v. NLRB, 459 F.2d 1143 (D.C. Cir, 1972).
107 388 U.S. at 180-81,
'° Id. at 183.
I09 This is consistent with the view taken by the trial examiner in Booster Lodge No.
405, Machinists, 185 N.L.R,B, 380, 392 (1970).
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As stated by former Chairman McCulloch in his dissent in Arrow
Development:
Rif the amount of a fine is such as to be inordinately
disproportionate to the needed protection, an inference is
warranted that the fine was imposed on the member, not
in vindication of a legitimate union interest, but as a
reprisal . . . . 11 °
Therefore, if a fine is in excess of the benefits earned during the
strike, it constitutes a total restraint that is greater than necessary to
enforce the rule and should not be sustained by the state courts."'
Two ways have been suggested by Professors Bok and Dunlop
for determining the "benefits" derived from strikebreaking. They
propose that a reasonable fine should not exceed either the wages
earned during the walkout (less any strike benefits that were pro-
vided) or the benefits that will be received over the term of the new
agreement negotiated as a result of the strike.' 12 As to the latter
possibility, the authors admit that there would be practical problems
in measuring the benefits, since the worth of the new agreement is
often not translatable into dollar figures. 113 For this reason, it is
submitted that the size of the fine should be geared to the wages
earned during the strike.
It is suggested that various standards of reasonableness may be
acceptable as long as deterrence is assured. Total deterrence—the
net wages earned while strikebreaking or the wages minus the
available strike benefits—may be reasonable. A percentage of the
wages earned could also be reasonable as long as the fine would
serve to deter all but those willing to work for a pittance." 4 In
either case, according to this analysis, the $450 fine imposed by the
union in Boeing should be invalidated. A flat amount of $450 is
inequitable, for it discriminates between members at different wage
levels as opposed to a fine geared to the salary earned." 5
 In addi-
tion, at the hearing, it was pointed out that the fine was more than
four times the weekly earnings (excluding overtime and bonus time)
of the lowest paid strikebreakers, and it was more than twice the
110 185 N.L.R.B. at 370, 75 L.R.R.M. at 1012 (1970) (dissenting opinion). See note 15
supra.
III Comment, supra note 73, at 1560.
112 D. Bok & J. Dunlop, supra note 101, at 106-07.
113 Id. See also Gould, supra note 87, at 1124-25, where the author states that not only
would it be difficult to calculate the benefits that are derived from a new contract, but more
importantly, this rule would come close to creating two groups of employees—non-union as
well as union—in the bargaining unit and could build the distinction directly into the workers'
employment status by depriving one class of the benefits of the agreement,
114 Comment, supra note 73, at 1559-60. The trial examiner determined that a fine of
35% or less of straight time and 80% of bonus or overtime is "presumptively" reasonable. 185
N.L.R.B. at 394.
115
 See Rapore, supra note 90, at 736.
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versity Faculty of Law Association, which sought a separate unit for
the full-time faculty members of the Law School. The two cases
were combined for a hearing before the National Labor Relations
Board (the Board or NLRB). Affirming the rulings of the hearing
officer, the Board HELD: as part-time or adjunct faculty do not
have a significant community of interest with full-time faculty mem-
bers, they must be excluded from the bargaining unit of full-time
faculty. 2 University of New Haven, Inc. 3 and similar cases4
 are
overruled to the extent inconsistent with this decision. 5 The Board
also found that the law faculty at New York University (NYU) had
special interests and allegiances different from those of the rest of
the university faculty, so a separate unit was appropriate, although
the overall unit would also be appropriate. Thus the law faculty
could elect either to be part of a university-wide unit, to form a
separate unit, or to have no representation at alL 6 In addition, the
Board found that professional librarians' and department chairmen8
at NYU should be included in the overall bargaining unit. Chair-
man Miller and Member Fanning wrote strong dissenting opinions 9
which criticized the decision to overrule New Haven and similar
cases, which had enunciated the rule that part-time faculty should
be included in the same unit as full-time faculty."
New York University is an attempt by the NLRB to strengthen
its guidelines for appropriate collective bargaining units in a univer-
sity setting and to retreat from the confusion which prior holdings
have generated with respect to part-time faculty members. The case
follows previous Board policy on the issues of a separate law faculty
2 Id. at 12, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1553. The Board uses the terms part-time faculty and
adjunct faculty interchangeably. This note adopts the same usage.
3 190 N.L.R.B. 478, 77 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1971).
Catholic University, 201 N.L.R.B. No. 145, 82 L.R.R.M. 1385 (1973); Florida South-
ern College, 196 N.L.R.B. No. 133, 80 L.R.R.M. 1160 (1972); Ade1phi University, 195
N.L.R.B. 639, 79 L.R.R.M. 1545 (1972); Manhattan College, 195 N.L.R.B. 65, 79 L.R.R.M.
1253 (1972); University of Detroit, 193 N.L.R.B. 566, 78 L.R.R.M. 1273 (1971); C.W. Post
Center of Long Island University, 189 N.L. R.B. 904, 77 L. R. R.M. 1001 (1971).
5 205 N.L.R.B. No. 16 at 12 n.12, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1553 n.12.
6 Id. at 8, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1552. The procedure to be followed, detailed in Syracuse
University, 204 N.L.R.B. No. 85, 83 L.R.R.M. 1373, 1376 (1973), is thus different from a
typical Globe (Globe Machine Stamping Co., 3 N.L.R.B. 294, lA L.R.R.M. 122 (1937))
election, in which employees vote in two groups, the minority group of skilled employees (the
law faculty) having the option of voting for representation in a separate unit. If separate
representation is not favored by the majority in the skilled unit, then their votes are pooled
with those of the other voting group to determine the question of representation in the overall
unit. The Globe procedure assures representation if a majority of the combined voting groups
favor it, whereas the new procedure allows the law faculty to vote for no representation at all.
For a criticism of this new procedure, see Syracuse University, supra at 15, 83 L.R.R.M. at
1377 (dissenting opinion), wherein Members Fanning and Penello question the wisdom of
bestowing extraordinary status on the law faculty.
205 N.L.R.B. No. 16 at 13, 83 L.R.R.M, at 1553.
° Id. at 15-16, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1554.
9 Id. at 21, 23, 83 L.R.R.M. at 1555 (dissenting opinions).
I° See cases cited in note 4 supra.
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weekly earnings of the highest paid strikebreakers. 116 The fines,
therefore, exceeded the legitimate interest of the union and merely
served as retribution.
Despite the desirability of forming standards to judge the
reasonableness of fines, it must be noted that there are inherent
limitations to the foregoing scheme. The proposed standards are
limited in scope and applicability, for they only apply to activities
for which a member receives pay.'" Although fining a member for
strikebreaking is a common form of union discipline, there are many
union offenses which do not involve financial gain for the violator,
such as dual unionism,' 18 refusal to perform picket duty," 9 nonat-
tendance at union meetings, or failure to pay dues in a timely
manner. In these cases, the size of the fine cannot be measured in
terms of the violator's monetary gain. It may be that the reasonable-
ness of a fine imposed for such activities is not susceptible to being
judged according to a standard, but rather that judgment must be
made on an individual, case-by-case basis. Nonetheless, the impos-
sibility of defining standards for all union violations does not detract
from the need for standards as to fines for the serious union offense
of strikebreaking. 12 °
ELLEN S. HUVELLE
Labor Law—Determination of the Appropriate Ficulty Bargaining
Unit in a Private University—New York University. '—Petitioner,
New York University Chapter, American Association of Univer-
sity Professors, sought a bargaining unit comprised of all full-time
faculty members of the university, including professional librarians,
as well as half-time faculty in the school of dentistry. The local
chapter of the United Federation of College Teachers intervened,
seeking to include all regular part-time faculty of the university in
the appropriate unit. A second petitioner was the New York Uni-
116 185 N.L.R.B. at 390 (trial examiner's decision).
117 See Rapore, supra note 90, at 736. Due to the limited applicability of a standard,
Rapore suggests that the notice given to the member as well as the amount of the fine should
be a criterion of reasonableness. He proposes that reasonable notice may require that a
member be specifically informed that certain activities will subject him to fines which may be
court-enforced. Id. at 737. The trial examiner in Boeing decided that the notice requirement
had not been met since the members were not specifically informed that they would be subject
to fines for working during the strike and that they were not informed as to the approximate
amount of the fine. 185 N.L.R.B. at 397-98.
lig E.g., Ballas v. McKiernan, 74 L.R.R.M. 2647 (N, Y. City Civ. Ct. 1970).
I" E.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 109 N.L.R.B. 727, 34 L.R.R.M. 1431 (1954).
12° See Summers, Disciplinary Powers of Unions, 3 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 483, 489 &
n.21 (1950), where the author observes that unions, during the "total war" of a strike, tend to
treat any defection which benefits the employer "as clear treason," to be punished by whatever
weapons the provisions of a union constitution may allow.
205 N.L.R,B. No. 16, 83 L.R.R.M. 1549 (1973).
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